The Cambodian Elections: Lessons Learned and Future Directions

By Prum Sokha

The author has personally been involved in all three of the post-Paris Peace Agreement elections in Cambodia. These were the United Nation-organized election for a Constituent Assembly in May 1993, the election for the National Assembly five years later in July 1998, and the nation-wide Commune Council Elections in February 2002.

Each of the elections in 1993, 1998, and 2002 had flaws and triumphs. Some of these issues have already been documented, and there is no doubt that they will continue to be debated for a long time to come. Constructive debate and discussion of these issues is to be welcomed.

Probably the most outstanding feature is that the constitutional electoral process has not merely survived times of great political tension, but that it has also improved and has been become entrenched. Elections have even been extended to commune or grassroots level. Elections in Cambodia now have a degree of credibility, legitimacy and acceptability that could not have been envisioned only a few short years ago.

Despite a variety of problems, the three elections were conducted honestly with internationally recognized technical skills. It is also gratifying to note that violence and irregularities decreased with each election. The election processes have also stimulated the rapid growth of a democracy related civil society that has assisted each successive election to have better informed voters and more carefully scrutinized processes.

The greater triumph of the elections, however, is the enthusiasm for democracy that Cambodian people have shown by their overwhelming participation in the polls, sometimes in spite of possible danger from groups opposed to the elections. The Cambodian people now regard as properly elected democratic government as an entitlement and a way of life.

The 1993 election was imposed by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as part of the initial peace settlement. Its end result was to have three of the four Cambodian factions working together. The fourth faction, the Khmer Rouge, withdrew from the democratic institutions, which was its greatest loss.

Much of the initiative and motivation for free and fair elections in 1998 came from the international community with the goal of creating peace among the factions which had been at odds in July 1997. The outcome of this election of reconciliation was the coalition government.

The conduct of successful elections in 1998 opened up tremendous possibilities for Cambodia. As the Prime Minister, H.E. Samdech Hun Sen, said at the ASEAN lecture in Singapore on 11 March 2002: “Following the 1998 elections, which external and internal observer teams described as ‘the miracle on the Mekong’, we conducted a ‘win-win’ policy leading to genuine national reconciliation without external influences. This policy resulted in the dismantling of the political and military organization of the Khmer Rouge and the unification of our territory for the first time during the last four centuries.” It also resulted in the Royal Government having the mandate to build a new political platform, the “Triangular Strategy,” which is to build peace, seek international integration and launch key administrative reforms for economic development.

The writer Sorpong Peou said of Cambodia in 1999: “The election law and system… are fundamentally sound. The creation of an independent election committee to run the election…is a major achievement. In 1998 Cambodian election authorities demonstrated… that they could conduct elections to a high technical standard.”

In February of this year, the election process was used to expand democracy to the local level of Cambodian society, and to entrench it. The international community did not enforce or impose decentralization or the local democratic elections of the commune councils. This was a Cambodian initiative to further consolidate democracy and to promote development. Indeed, in the early stages, some members of the international community sometimes regarded this initiative with suspicion and skepticism.

The commune council elections of 2002 breathed life into an enormous experiment in democratic decentralization and development. This endeavor still has far to go, but the important issue is that the process has begun and will continue to move in this direction.

Initiative, modern concepts of democracy and election processes came to Cambodia from foreign countries. Today, election are internal, and an integral part of the Cambodian fabric.

Elections in Cambodia, like many other countries, have successfully regulated and channeled competing political forces: keeping the competition for power within the voting booths and the exercise of power within recognized institutions.

Election processes impose constraints and provide specific outlets for human behavior. They facilitate a particular kind of human interaction, that is, or should be, commonly understood and accepted by the participations. In other words, election processes set the “rule of the game.”

At this early stage in the democratic development of Cambodia, these electoral rules have been largely imported. It is clear that they will need greater adaptation to suit particular national or local circumstances. As we say in Cambodia, one should not cut the head to fit the hat, or cut the feet to fit the shoe! Past election rules and procedures are perhaps not yet the right fits for Cambodia. At the same time, we must be careful of the game” that are in operation at any time, and should comply with those rules, and accept the outcome that is in accordance with them.

Election processes, election management and election conduct in Cambodia will therefore require constant vigilance and improvement by Cambodians. Cambodia still has a long way to go in these respects, but the process has started and it cannot be stopped.

The academic Jeffrey Gallup believes that “special mention must be made of the extraordinary role played by local non-governmental organizations in the 1998 elections.” The same can be said of the 2002 elections. “These civic groups joined together to conduct a major share of all voter education activities. They also mounted a comprehensive, countrywide election monitoring effort that severely limited the opportunities for undetected fraud or violence. Their vigilance should have a profound effect on future polls.”

The positive attitude of the Cambodian people towards elections is the most encouraging the outcome of all three elections. Eligible voters registered and voted with enthusiasm, and the prospects for continued democratization in Cambodia are promising.

Even with the greatest financial moderation and restraint, elections are costly. Cambodia will have to accept that this as an inevitable and essential price that must be paid for democracy. However, the reasons for apparently high costs must be constantly reviewed and evaluated, and economics must be developed.

Internationally, some elections are substantially more expensive than others. One very significant factor affecting cost is the duration of previous experiences with multi-party elections. Significant cost differences exist between routine elections in stable democracies, elections in transitional democracies, and elections during special peacekeeping operations [1]. Cost comparisons are difficult and must be treated with caution, but some observations may be pertinent.

In countries with long multi-party democratic experience, it seems that elections are consistently less costly than in countries where elections are a new undertaking. Electoral costs of approximately $1 to $3 per elector tend to be manifested in countries with longer electoral experience [2].

In most countries that have less multi-party electoral experience, cost tends to be higher [3] ranging roughly from $3.70 to an extreme high of $11.

Elections that have taken place as part of peacekeeping operations have the highest cost [4]. For example, the Cambodian elections of 1993 cost $45 per elector. As a matter of interest, this figure dropped to $5 in the elections of 1998. The local government elections of 2002, which involved full voter registration and complex logistic arrangements, cost approximately $3.27 per registered voter.

Duration and experience of the electoral practice itself therefore seems to be a very significant factor in reducing costs, even taking into account the peculiarities of peacekeeping elections. In time, therefore, Cambodian elections might be expected to stabilize and realize the fruits of investing in experience.

Local elections are fundamental for the maintenance of democratic governance and development. However, while local elections are in many respects no less important than national elections, and are often unavoidably just as costly as national elections, the international donor community does not regard them in same light, at least for the purposes of international financial assistance. This emerging struggle for competing resources between local and national elections must be resolved, and warrants very serious review in many developing countries.

No review of any of the three elections would be complete without recognizing the important role of the international community in providing technical assistance and funding. Different countries had different agenda in supporting the Cambodian elections, but the combined effect was a positive one and the Royal Government is keenly aware of the need to learn lessons from the three previous elections. This is particularly important to ensure that the quality of the 2003 elections will be higher that any that have been held before.

(Source: Dr. Kao Kim Hourn: Elections in Cambodia: Lessons Learned and Future Direction, Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), page 23-29, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia)


[1] Election Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance. Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, September 2000.

[2] United State; most Western European countries; Chile, $1.20; Costa Rica, $1.80; Brazil, $2.30; Benin, $1.60; Botswana, $2.70; Ghana, $0.70; and Senegal $1.20 in Africa; India $1; and Pakistan, $0.50 in Asia; and Australia, $3.20.

[3] Mexico, $5.90, El Salvador, $4.10; and Paraguay, $3.70; in Latin America; South Africa, $11; Lesotho, $6.90; Liberia $6.10; and Uganda, $3.70 in Africa; and Russia, $7.50 in Eastern Europe, El Salvador dropped to $3.10 in 1997.

[4] Nicaragua in 1990, $11.80; Angola in 1992, $22; Mozambique in 1994, $10.20; Palestine in 1996, $9, Subsequent elections in Nicaragua dropped to $7.50 in 1996.

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