Land Disputes: Finding Justice through Collective Action
Prime Minister Hun Sen has repeatedly warned that a failure to improve land management and stop “land grabbing” could lead to a “farmers’ revolution.” While the World Bank is supporting the government to title more land under its Land Management and Administration Project, the issue of what to do about existing land disputes remains a concern. A soon-to-be released study undertaken by the Center for Advanced Study as part of the World Bank’s justice for the poor program looks at how people are currently dealing with disputes over land. Though the report finds that the odds in such disputes are stacked in favor of the rich and powerful with their government connections, the picture is not completely bleak.
The study finds that more just and equitable outcomes are possible when the poor engage with the state collectively. World Bank legal specialist, Daniel Adler shares the findings of the study with the World Bank Newsletter.
Q: Has land grabbing by local elites united poor communities into coherent resistance movements? And does the resistance bring any benefit to the poor?
Our study finds that collective action in response to land disputes is prevalent and that there are circumstances in which it can be effective. With pressure on land and natural resources increasing, there is a willingness for villagers to pursue claims, even against people who are rich or powerful. While the propensity for people to organize around land disputes is known from cases covered in the national media, it is noteworthy that similar claim-making behavior is widespread with regard to smaller disputes.
It is also noteworthy that the state is not impervious to these claims. Without suggesting that the disputes studied were resolved satisfactorily, it was apparent that where they acted collectively villagers were able to achieve fairer and more equitable outcomes than might otherwise have been the case.
Q: Is collective action by poor people necessary for them to secure justice?
The improved outcome observed when villagers act collectively suggests that group mobilization may be a necessary precursor to the success of rights based strategies. In the absence of equitable rule-based systems for allocating resources and resolving disputes, it seems that collective action is a crucial mechanism for improving the responsiveness of the state to the needs of the poor.
Q: What specific factors has your study identified as enabling villagers to assert their land claims effectively?
Three key factors were identified as enabling villagers to make effective claims. First, they need to be able to organize as a group. Second, they need to be able to attract the attention of higher-level decision-makers. And third, their success hinges on their ability to persuade those decision-makers of the merits of their case.
Q: Did your study find any particular catalyst enabling villagers to organize effectively?
One factor influencing group formation was the existence of village-level leaders with strong coalition-building skills and who were willing to take the lead in approaching the authorities. Such individuals were able to build issue-based coalitions across political and social divides and to sustain the group cohesion required to mount an effective claim. In cases where no formal claims were made, the absence of such leadership was notable. Even though the villagers in our case studies represented themselves, access to information and advocacy support from NGOs were important factors leading to success in a number of cases.
Q: How do villagers attract the attention of the decision-makers they need to reach?
Pathways to these decision makers were found through personal contacts, local and international NGOs, the media, local government officials and representative of the political opposition. It was notable that a lack of prior training on the law did not hinder villagers in pursuing their claims. Given the political/administrative paths which the disputes followed a lack of legal knowledge was not a major issue and it was generally sufficient that information and advocacy support was available from trusted resource people (often in the NGO sector) once disputes arose.
Q: But even when the villagers get the attention of influential decision makers, how do they persuade them of the merits of their case?
In our case studies, the basis on which the state, or its officials, engaged with villagers’ claims was opaque. Assuming that decision makers in these cases are responding to the political pressure that constituencies bring to bear, one important binding constraint to effective advocacy was the scale on which people were able to organize.
In the cases studied, this occurred only on the village level, despite the fact that the issues around which people were mobilizing often raised matters which could have been dealt with on a larger scale. The issues dealt with in our case studies would have lent themselves to joint claims involving multiple villages but this did not occur. For the moment, advocacy would appear to be based on ephemeral groups that form around personal connections.
The absence of broader social movements around land and natural resources issues in Cambodia is notable. So too is the lack of an institution that serves as a public forum around which such collective action might be structured, at once amplifying the voice of the poor and channeling land conflict away from violence. On the other hand, however, it would also appear that citizens are becoming more willing to resist.
With regard to one case we found that significant improvements in road access and other infrastructure including media and telecommunications coverage reduced locals’ sense of isolation and vulnerability over time. With greater connection to the outside world came a feeling of having to rely less exclusively on local authorities; this seems to have contributed to a sense that villagers could pursue claims against representatives of local government with greater vigor than before. Equally important, however, is the lack of other options. Whereas before if the poor were moved off land they might have simply cleared more, these options are now restricted because land is scarce on the one hand and more tightly regulated on the other.
Q: Do appeals to powerful people such as the Prime Minister prove effective? If so why?
We did not observe appeals to the PM in our research. However we did find that in attempting to engage the state in the dispute resolution process, villagers inevitably looked to get a powerful administrative decision-maker to intervene on their behalf. Though this was effective in some cases, the reasons why higher level decision makers are brokering compromises is not entirely clear.
In the study we conclude that while little faith is put in the law, each of our cases reveals a system of governance which requires a degree of responsiveness to land claims brought by groups of villagers. The officials called upon to resolve these disputes are often struggling to reconcile competing interests.
Although the processes by which officials make decisions remain something of a ‘black box’, pressures at the national level for the government to be responsive would appear to come from a number of sources.
First, there is concern to avoid the social instability that could arise from increasing land conflict. Thus the Prime Minister has repeatedly warned that a failure to improve land management and stop ‘land grabbing’ could lead to a farmers’ or peasant revolution. Similarly, a pressure to be responsive emerges from the Government’s need to sustain its legitimacy in the eyes of a predominantly rural populace. Local pressures are augmented by relationships of accountability that exist between donors and government and the desire of the latter to be seen as a responsible member of the international community and one worthy of receiving development assistance. Villagers and their supporters seem to be aware of these sensitivities and use advocacy strategies such as contacting media and national NGOs in order to tap into national and international public opinion.
The incentive framework in which local officials operate is complex. Good performance means maintaining social harmony, ensuring success at the ballot box, achieving the government’s policy targets with regards to private sector development and economic growth, as well as identifying sufficient rent-seeking opportunities to ensure material and/or professional advancement.
Although power in Cambodia today derives significantly from binding elite` factions together, the patterns encountered in our fieldwork suggest that the administration is also dependent on peripheral clients for its legitimacy and as such that it is also somewhat sensitive to the articulation of demands from such constituencies.
Balancing such diverse political interests requires compromise. It is within this framework that it makes sense for villagers to leverage whatever political capital they can muster so as collectively to attract the attention of influential political decision makers to their grievances.
Q: Do land disputes have adverse effects on business and private-sector development?
Land disputes can damage the prospects for private sector development. Local entrepreneurs rely on local-level authorities to provide them with the authorizations needed to undertake new projects. If these are issued and then revoked without any sense of due process an atmosphere of uncertainly is generated.
As a result of disputes, investors lose confidence in ‘official stamps’ on which they relied as evidence that their projects had been approved. This lack of bureaucratic certainty encourages business to go straight to the top and deal only with high-ranking individuals perceived to have the personal power to protect the initiatives they authorize. One investor frustrated by a dispute suggested that in the future he would wait for the signature of the provincial governor himself rather than deal with the deputy governor.
Q: Do disputes have any effect on investors’ attitude to the villagers?
Other investors expressed regret at having relied too much on the commune council to conduct consultations with villagers prior to initiating the project. However, they indicated that there was a lesson learned from this experience. After the experience of having had a project fail because of resistance from the villagers, they indicated that they would now take a different approach. Rather than relying on the commune council to liaise with villagers they suggested that in the future they would talk and work with villagers directly to get their consent first and then address the authorities for approval later.
Q: What are the overall implications for the private sector?
These findings portray a private sector in a state of flux. On the one hand we see close cooperation or even collusion between investors and local authorities –the former needing government approval for their projects, and the latter having immediate personal interests in the approval of such projects. We also see government officials with a high level of direct involvement in private sector initiatives. These factors blur the distinction between the private sector and the state and make it difficult to rely on the state as an honest broker in such transactions.
However, our research also suggests that the interests of the government sit less than completely flush with those of the private sector. Investors demand quick secure decisions from the state. But the absence of well embedded legal and bureaucratic processes for making such decisions means that administrative decisions are subject to review as political circumstances change – for example in response to collective action. Uncertainty in decision-making leads to dissatisfaction with government among the business community.
While the immediate response may be to seek ever higher-level support for projects through the patronage system, this is unlikely to be a viable long term strategy in a growing and diversifying economy. In these circumstances the business community may emerge as an important advocate for learer and more certain administrative decision making according to law.
Q: Is there evidence that pressure from the people can improve governance?
International experience has shown that good governance emerges at least partially in response to demand from citizens for greater accountability and better quality of services. If you like, what we have documented in our research are organic expressions of the demand for better governance around land issues in Cambodia. We have also observed that government is, at least in some contexts, responsive to these expressions of demand.
To be sure, the forms of organization we are witnessing are embryonic. Similarly, government responses are not always positive and it is a well-known fact that a number of high-profile land disputes have led to violent evictions and even killings in recent years. In these circumstances both the ability of citizens to peacefully express their demands on government and the capacity of government to respond to demand in a constructive fashion need to be supported.
(Source: The World Bank Newsletter, Volume 4, Number 9, September 2006)